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Paying communities or producers to maintain the quality of water or biodiversity; 
encouraging farmers to adopt environmentally friendly practices; paying deve-
loping countries to avoid deforestation and thereby reduce CO2 emissions: interest 
in payments for environmental services (PES) is growing throughout the world.
However, past experience shows that PES are not without their problems: the 
criterion used to determine the amount; the methods used to evaluate effec-
tiveness; and the uncertain use of payments, etc. Hence the proposal to combine 
direct incentives to protect ecosystems, especially forests, with the ecological 
intensification of agriculture and investment in land.
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What can be done to correct the negative 
impact of human activities on the benefits 
that nature provides to humankind, the envi-
ronmental services such as the regulation of 
ecological processes (climate, floods), or the 
cultural advantages?
Several options exist: regulation, mediation 
and taxation, for example. Or even paying 
actors to conduct environmentally friendly 
initiatives or to give up destructive practices: 
payments for environmental services (PES). 
Although this term is ambiguous – it does 
not imply paying nature, but paying people to 
ensure that through their practices, they favour 
certain services provided by ecosystems –, it is 
widely used in literature and has been given 
several definitions.
One of the most commonly used definitions is 
that of Sven Wunder: “a voluntary transaction 
in which a well defined environmental service 
(ES) or a form of land use likely to secure that 
service is bought by at least one ES buyer from 
a minimum of one ES provider, if and only if 
the provider continues to supply that service 
(conditionality)”.
This definition uses market terminology 
(buying, selling), which implies that the serv-
ices have been appropriated prior to the trans-
action (one can only sell what one possesses). 
However, environmental services are qualities 
associated with elements (for example the 
quality of water flowing through a drainage 
basin, or the carbon storage capacity of a 
forest) that cannot be appropriated.
The definition we propose is somewhat differ-
ent: a PES is a payment to an agent for services 
provided to other agents (wherever they may be 
in space and time) by means of a deliberate action 
aimed at preserving, restoring or increasing an 
environmental service agreed by the parties. PES 
therefore result from a voluntary agreement 
between parties, in other words they are based 
on contracts that are explicit or implicit (oral 
agreements), and which set out the service 
expected and the corresponding payments, as 
well as for how long the service must be pro-
vided. 
market price due to operating and transac-
tion costs.
The amount of a PES does not therefore 
depend on the monetary evaluation of natural 
assets. It is determined by means of negotia-
tions, which may or may not be balanced, and 
should in principle cover at least the net cost 
of giving up an activity (the opportunity cost) 
linked to the usage restrictions or changes.
Indexing payments on the opportunity cost 
nevertheless has certain disadvantages and 
negative side effects.
“Carbon” PES (especially through avoided 
deforestation, the basis of the REDD mecha-
nism - Reducing Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Forest Degradation) may be sources 
of financial gains for operators. In a carbon 
market (voluntary or regulated) with a single 
price per tonne of CO2 resulting from supply 
and demand, some agents providing an avoided 
deforestation service will have opportunity 
costs that are lower than the value of avoided 
emissions, calculated on the basis of the price 
per tonne of CO2. This difference between the 
“production cost” of avoided deforestation and 
its “purchasing price” creates a surplus. This 
surplus may be conserved by the agents, but 
will more likely be captured by carbon market 
brokers or PES project promoters, who will 
thereby pay themselves to varying extents.
Moreover, conserving forests in agricultural 
frontiers in the Amazon instead of cultivating 
soybean, or in South Asia instead of planting 
oil palms, generates opportunity costs that are 
often high since these crops are very lucrative. 
PES programmes will therefore concentrate 
on forests that are under less threat at the risk 
of paying actors who have nothing to lose by 
avoiding deforestation (zero opportunity cost).
PES are caught between two stumbling blocks: 
where the opportunity costs are high, the sums 
available are often not enough; but where the 
opportunity cost is low, the risk of paying for 
environmental services that are not endangered 
(lack of additionality) is high. Verifying addi-
tionality would require significant means in 
order to analyse local situations, which would 
imply higher costs.
A major problem where PES and their social 
acceptability are concerned is that compensa-
tion based on the opportunity cost is ineq-
uitable for the poorest populations. Freezing 
user rights such as clearing, hunting or even 
the prospect of working in a forestry company 
deprives people of opportunities to lift them-
selves out of poverty. Moreover, within com-
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A distinction can be made between two cat-
egories of environmental services that may be 
concerned by payments, with implications in 
terms of institutional forms and evaluating 
the effectiveness of the tool.
Those concerning collective goods are 
profitable to a limited number of beneficiar-
ies. They are often the subject of bilateral 
agreements between a community of farmers 
on the one hand and a company, a water 
association or a municipality on the other, 
for example. The direct beneficiary of the 
service is the payer. Evaluating effectiveness 
is often straightforward. For example, in a 
water PES, the resumption of deforestation 
upstream of a drainage basin, for instance, 
will be detected through repercussions on 
water quality downstream.
Those concerning public goods benefit 
everyone (including future generations). 
They imply institutional mediation between 
the beneficiary – the whole world – and 
local service providers. The international 
emissions trading market and the CCX, 
or Chicago Climate Exchange (voluntary 
market for emissions reductions) are some 
of the methods of mediation, while the 
major organisations financing conservation 
are another. The global nature of these ser-
vices makes it impossible to verify the effec-
tive return. For example, if deforestation is 
transferred outside an area covered by a PES 
contract, it will be impossible to detect this 
in global CO2 emissions. The environmental 
efficiency will therefore be diminished by 
this.
The thorny issue of evaluating 
the amount of PES
In the case of PES that result in restrictions 
on land use (the only ones covered here), the 
amount of the PES differs from the monetary 
value of the service, just as in economics, the 
price is different from the value. If there is no 
market, as for biodiversity, the scope of the 
monetary evaluation is limited, especially as it 
is difficult to establish an economic value for 
heterogeneous assets, including “remarkable” 
assets. If the service has a market, however, 
as for carbon, the price of the service will 
depend on the relationship between supply 
and demand, but will not correspond to the 
munities, it is often the poorest who depend 
on natural resources. By giving up certain 
activities, they lose vital access rights that are 
not generally offset by the payments, which are 
based on the average opportunity cost for the 
whole community. Nor is it unusual for these 
payments to be monopolised by the “elites”. 
Simply compensating the opportunity cost 
for very poor farmers therefore raises ethical 
objections and is enough to justify envisaging 
another basis for payments.
Finally, adopting the opportunity cost as a basis 
for compensation does not prepare for the long 
term. Compensating for the loss of income 
from giving up certain subsistence activities 
may free up working time but does not release 
any new resources to acquire the capital needed 
to implement new agricultural or agroforestry 
technologies.
However, increasing food production without 
encroaching upon forests and protected areas 
is a considerable challenge, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa, where almost one in three 
people are undernourished. Increasing yields 
and thereby limiting the extension of agri-
cultural land is one of the keys to increas-
ing agricultural production while controlling 
deforestation.
A new conditionality...
However, although the ecological intensi-
fication of agriculture is a necessary condi-
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tion for reducing pressure on ecosystems, it is 
insufficient. This is seen in the relative failure 
of the Alternative to slash-and-burn (ASB) 
programmes of the 1990s: with the extra 
income generated thanks to intensification 
programmes, farmers developed cash crops at 
the expense of the forests.
Hence the proposal to combine investment in 
more intensive agricultural technologies with 
direct incentives linked to forest preserva-
tion provided by PES. Broader PES, in other 
words aimed at investment, may combine 
direct incentives with conditionality that was 
previously lacking.
In addition to compensation for opportunity 
costs, PES must include a one-off, time-limited 
investment subsidy. This subsidy will serve to 
develop areas that have already been cleared and 
to grow permanent crops there using new sus-
tainable agricultural technologies. It will only 
make sense if it is part of a mechanism propos-
ing viable alternative agricultural technologies, 
rural credit programmes and land tenure secu-
rity procedures through the registration and 
mapping of local rights. A mechanism of this 
kind must be accompanied by an integrated 
programme of support and agricultural train-
ing, in order to assist farmers and to reduce the 
risk of failure.
To ensure agents do not use subsidies for 
immediate consumption, one option is to use 
a complementary currency to limit purchases 
to uses set out in the contract: replacing goods 
and commodities as a result of usage restric-
tions; and purchasing material, selected seed, 
inputs and agricultural services, etc.
The diagram below was proposed in Mada-
gascar as part of preparations for a biodiversity 
management programme in the Ambohilero 
forest (municipality of Didy).
Diagram of a PES to reduce agricultural deforestation 
and to guide spending towards local investment, using 
a complementary currency
This text is the result of several research studies: 
those conducted in Madagascar as part of the 
FFEM-CIRAD-COgESFOR project; surveys 
conducted in areas covered by the conservation 
contracts concluded by Conservation International 
with several communities bordering a protected area 
in north-east Madagascar; and discussions held as 
part of the SERENA project (ANR funding). 
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In this diagram, a compensation office changes 
money into the complementary currency and 
vice versa. The specific currency (in the form 
of vouchers) is given to the operator in charge 
of the implementation and monitoring of the 
PES. The vouchers are then given to house-
holds or groups complying with the contract, 
who contact a local structure (municipal coop-
erative or shopkeeper taking part in the pro-
gramme) which provides them with material 
and expertise.
The controversial side to using this kind of 
complementary currency is that it restricts the 
freedom of farmers who accept the PES con-
tract by forcing them to use the funds received. 
This issue requires discussion of its own.
... for part of the PES
In addition to the opportunity cost and the 
investment subsidy, the PES must also include 
operating and transaction costs. The total cost 
of the PES would therefore be divided into 
three parts.
The opportunity cost remains a useful reference, 
especially to account for the conditional link 
between the direct payments and the envi-
ronmental service. It is the payment of this 
part that could be suspended to sanction any 
breach of contract.
The investment costs of changes in agricultural 
practices are linked to the whole of the PES 
contract and must be understood as such by 
recipients.
Clarifying local land rights is a precondition 
for both setting up payments and facilitating 
the adoption of new agricultural practices. This 
may require reforming the land tenure regime 
(always a politically delicate endeavour), which 
generates costs that must be considered as 
investment at the local and national levels.
The fact that this investment must be deployed 
over the long term means it cannot be subject 
to the same suspension conditions as the 
amounts paid for the opportunity cost.
Finally, it is also important to include the 
operating costs linked to the establishment of 
these programmes and the transaction costs that 
occur when drawing up contracts and moni-
toring the application of agreements, in order 
to verify their effectiveness and any socially 
undesirable effects.
Setting up effective and sustainable PES will 
be costly, at least in the short and medium 
term, and will undoubtedly make it less finan-
cially attractive to use PES to protect bio-
diversity and to combat deforestation. But 
the principle of a payment over and above 
the opportunity cost sketches what could 
be a dividing line between PES that are 
based solely on compensation for user rights 
and investment PES aimed at financing 
local development that uses environmental 
resources sparingly and that could become 
autonomous in the long term.
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